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I N T E R N A T I O N A L

L A W

When May a Government
Challenge a Decision That an
Action Can Proceed in Its Absence?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 267–272. © 2008 American Bar Association.

After Marcos was deposed from
power in 1986, President Corazon
Aquino created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), an agency charged with
recovering assets of the republic
wrongfully acquired by Marcos while
he was in office. In July 2000, the
PCGG asked Merrill Lynch to turn
over the Arelma assets to the
Philippine National Bank. The
PCGG proposed the bank act as an
escrow agent and hold the assets
pending a ruling in the
Sandiganbayan, a Philippine anticorruption court, on whether the
assets belonged to the Republic or
to the Marcos estate.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
He is co-author of Electronic
Discovery And Records
Management. Prof. Grenig can be
reached at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (262) 646-3324.

ISSUE
May a district court award property
claimed by a foreign government
even when that government is
absent from the litigation by
virtue of its invocation of sovereign
immunity?

Merrill Lynch denied the request,
apparently because of the existence
of other claimants, and instead filed
an interpleader action in the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Hawaii seeking to resolve conflicting
claims to the Arelma assets. The
complaint named as defendants several possible claimants including the
Republic, the PCGG, Philippine
National Bank, Arelma, the estate of

FACTS
This litigation is part of an ongoing
dispute between the government of
the Republic of the Philippines and
creditors of the estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos over assets Marcos
allegedly secreted from the government while he was president of the
Philippines. In 1972, Marcos transferred approximately $2 million to
Arelma, S.A., a Panamanian stock
corporation. Arelma invested the
funds with Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith in New York. By
2000 that investment had grown to
approximately $35 million. The
shares of Arelma, a Panamanian
corporation, are held in escrow by
the Philippine National Bank pending an ownership determination by
the Philippine courts.

(Continued on Page 268)
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Case
at a
Glance
This appeal involves
an interpleader action
brought to settle
ownership of assets
misappropriated by
Ferdinand Marcos when
he was president of the
Republic of the
Philippines. The assets
are claimed both by the
Republic and by a class
of private judgment
creditors of the Marcos
estate. The Republic was
dismissed from the action
on sovereign immunity
grounds, but the action
continued in the absence
of the Republic and its
Presidential Commission
on Good Government.

Roger Roxas, the Golden Budha
Corporation, and Mariano J.
Pimentel. The Roxas estate and
Golden Budha asserted claims on
the basis of judgments obtained in
state courts.
The estate of Roger Roxas and the
Golden Budha Corporation have
similar interests. Roxas worked as a
locksmith in Baguio City, the
Philippines. He was also an amateur
treasure hunter. In 1961, Roxas met
a man who claimed that his father
had been in the Japanese army and
had drawn a map identifying the
location of the legendary
“Yamashita Treasure.” (There is disagreement whether the Yamashita
Treasure ever existed.) The treasure
purportedly consisted of booty plundered from various Southeast Asian
countries during World War II by
Japanese troops and allegedly
buried in the Philippines during the
final battle for the islands to keep it
out of the hands of the Americans.
(General Yamashita, also known as
“the Tiger of Malaya,” was executed
for war crimes after World War II.)
Roxas organized a group of partners
and laborers to search for the treasure and obtained a permit for that
purpose from Judge Pio Marcos, a
relative of Ferdinand. Judge Marcos
informed Roxas that, in accordance
with Philippine law, a 30 percent
share of any discovered treasure
would have to be paid to the
government.
Roxas’s group claimed to have found
a network of tunnels. After several
weeks spent digging and exploring
the tunnels, his group discovered a
10-foot thick concrete enclosure in
the floor of the tunnel. In 1971, the
group broke through the enclosure.
Inside, Roxas discovered a goldcolored Buddha statue, which he
estimated to be about three feet in
height. The statue was extremely
heavy and required 10 men to trans-

port it to the surface using a chain
block hoist, ropes, and rolling logs.
On April 5, 1971, men purporting to
be from two Philippine national
security agencies forced their way
into Roxas’s home. They took the
treasure and told Roxas that Marcos
had ordered the confiscation. Roxas
was later tortured and imprisoned.
After he filed suit in Hawaii, a jury
awarded $22 billion in compensatory damages and interest for a total
award of over $40 billion. The jury
did not award punitive damages. On
November 17, 1998, the Hawaii
Supreme Court reversed $22 billion
of the judgment and returned the
matter to the trial court for a
recomputation of the damages.
Roxas claimed the Arelma assets
both as a creditor of Marcos and on
the basis that the $2 million used by
Marcos to set up the Merrill Lynch
account were most probably derived
from the Yamashita Treasure and
can be traced to the property stolen
from Roxas.
Pimentel is the representative of
9,539 persons who brought suit
against Marcos after his fall from
power. In 1996 he won a judgment
against Marcos’s estate of nearly $2
billion. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.1996).
Pimentel had been arrested two
weeks after the declaration of martial law in the Republic in 1972. He
was held in detention centers for
four out of the next six years. On
his trip home from his final detention, the military kidnapped him.
They beat him with rifles, breaking
his teeth, an arm and a leg and dislocating his ribs. They then took
him to a remote sugarcane field,
buried him up to his neck, and left
him for dead.
The Republic and the PCGG argued
that they were entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (28 U.S.C.
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§ 1604). They also argued that their
unavailability because of sovereign
immunity required dismissal of the
action against them. Pimentel also
moved to dismiss the Republic and
the PCGG from the suit, claiming
they were not “real parties in interest” as required by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
On December 20, 2001, the district
court granted Pimentel’s motion to
dismiss the Republic and the PCGG.
The court concluded that they were
not real parties in interest and that
they were neither necessary nor
indispensable parties because they
had no enforceable claim to the
Arelma assets. The court declined
to decide any issue of sovereign
immunity.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding
that since the Republic and the
PCGG were immune from suit
under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, the district court
should have granted their motion to
dismiss them on that ground.
Because of that immunity, the Ninth
Circuit said the district court had
no authority to inquire into the
merits of their claim. The Ninth
Circuit also determined that the
Republic and the PCGG were “necessary” parties under Rule 19(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
who should participate in the action
“if feasible” because they have a
claim to the assets at issue in the
litigation. The Ninth Circuit ordered
that the litigation be stayed pending
resolution of litigation in the
Philippines regarding ownership of
the Arelma assets. In re Republic of
the Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143 (9th
Cir. 2002).
The matter was then returned to
the district court for further proceedings. The district court dissolved the stay and ruled that the
Republic and the PCGG, because
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they had been dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, were not
indispensable parties within the
meaning of Rule 19(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court found it would be
unjust to prevent the “Class of
Human Rights Victims,” persons
tortured, summarily executed, and
“disappeared,” from receiving the
proceeds of the Arelma account at
Merrill Lynch to partially satisfy
their judgment. However, it found
that Golden Budha and the estate of
Roxas had not proved that the
assets in the Merrill Lynch account
derived from assets allegedly stolen
from them. The court concluded
that Pimentel and the Class of
Human Rights Victims were entitled
to the entirety of the interpleaded
assets. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Arelma,
Inc., 2004 WL 5326929 (D. Hawaii
2004).
The Republic and the PCGG
appealed the decision. They maintained that they were indispensable
parties because the Arelma assets
were acquired by Marcos illegally
and never lawfully belonged to him
but rather from the beginning of his
acquisition they belonged to the
Republic. The Ninth Circuit found
that the Republic and the PCGG
were necessary parties because they
claim “an interest relating to the
subject to the action and [are] so
situated that the disposition of the
action in [their] absence may (i) as
a practical matter impair or impede
[their] ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of [their] claimed
interest.”
Recognizing that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19(b) distinguishes
between “necessary” and “indispensable parties,” the court

explained that indispensability must
meet a higher standard than necessity. The court concluded that the
Republic and the PCGG were not
indispensible parties and affirmed
the district court. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. ENC
Corp., 464 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2006).
The Republic, the PCGG, the
Philippine National Bank, and
Arelma asked the Supreme Court to
review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 3, 2007. In addition to the issue posed by the petition for certiorari, the Supreme
Court directed the parties to brief
and argue the following question:
Whether the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) and its
Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), having been dismissed from the
interpleader action based on
their successful assertion of foreign immunity, had the right to
appeal the district court’s determination that they were not
indispensable parties under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(b); and whether the Republic
and its PCGG have the right to
seek this Court’s review of the
court of appeals’s opinion affirming the district court.

CASE ANALYSIS
While the history of this litigation
involves tales of hidden treasure,
torture, and kidnapping, the case
before the Supreme Court concerns
procedural issues.
The underlying action in this case is
an interpleader action. “Interpleader”
is a procedure in which a person
holding a fund or stake against which
two or more persons have claims that
cannot both be satisfied out of the
value of the stake may compel the
adverse claimants to litigate their
claims to the stake in a single suit

that will determine who gets what.
Interpleader seeks to avoid double or
multiple litigation of the same basic
controversy and affords protection
against inconsistency of results that
might impose unfair liability.
Interpleader prevents the stakeholder from being obliged to determine
at its peril which claimant has the
better claim, and when the stakeholder has no interest in the fund,
forces the claimants to contest what
essentially is a controversy between
them without embroiling the stakeholder in the litigation over the merits of their respective claims. Even if
the stakeholder denies liability, in
whole or in part, to one or more of
the claimants, interpleader still protects the stakeholder from the vexation of multiple suits and the possibility of multiple liabilities that
could result from adverse determinations in different courts. The device
also can be used to protect the
claimants by bringing them together
in one action and reaching an equitable division of a limited fund.
In this action, Merrill Lynch is the
stakeholder and the claims include
those of the Republic, its PCGG, the
Bank, Arelma, the estate of Roger
Roxas, the Golden Budha
Corporation, and the class of persons represented by Pimentel. The
stake is the approximately $35 million held by Merrill Lynch.
While the Republic and the PCGG
were named as defendants in the
interpleader action, they were dismissed from the action as a result of
their assertion of sovereign immunity. They now claim that, under Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the interpleader action
cannot proceed in their absence
because they are necessary and
indispensable parties.
Normally a plaintiff, including a
plaintiff in an interpleader action,
(Continued on Page 270)
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has the right to decide who shall be
the parties to its lawsuit. This right
is defined by the rights of others,
however. The interests of a nonparty who cannot be joined must
be considered.
Rule 19 is intended to protect the
interests of absent persons as well
as those already before the court
from multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations. While a
court may not bind absent persons
or those who do not have a legally
sufficient connection or shared
interest with the actual parties, the
nonparty’s claim or defense may be
impaired as a practical matter.
Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968). The focus of Rule 19 is on
the interest of the courts and the
public in complete, consistent, and
efficient settlement of controversies.
The objection to the failure of a
plaintiff to join a party under Rule 19
may be made by a motion to dismiss.
However, the court will not dismiss
unless the suit cannot continue without the absent parties under Rule
19(b). The burden is on the person
making the motion to dismiss to
show that the absent party is indispensable and that the action should
therefore be dismissed.
Rule 19(a) defines those persons
who should be joined as parties to
the action. These parties are sometimes characterized as “necessary”
or “indispensable.” Rule 19(a) is
applicable when nonjoinder would
have either of the following effects.
First, it would prevent complete
relief from being accorded among
those who are parties to the action
or, second, the absentee “claims an
interest relating to the subject matter of the action and is so situated”
that the nonparty’s absence from
the action will have a prejudicial
effect on that person’s ability to protect that interest or will “leave any
of the persons already parties sub-

ject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations.”
The decision regarding whether
a particular nonparty must be
joined under Rule 19(a) is made in
terms of the general policies of
avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and
effective relief in a single action,
and protecting the absent persons
from the possible prejudicial effect
of deciding the case without them.
Consideration of what other alternatives are available to the litigants
must also be given.
If one or more of the tests in Rule
19(a) are met, the second sentence
of the Rule 19(a) requires that, if
the nonparty has not been joined,
the court must order that the person be made a party. Difficulties
arise when joinder of an absent party is not feasible. When joinder of
someone described in Rule 19(a) is
not feasible, such as where the
absent person has sovereign immunity, the court must examine the
four considerations described in
Rule 19(b) to determine whether
the action may go forward in the
nonparty’s absence or must be dismissed, “the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable.”
When it is not feasible to join someone described in Rule 19(a), Rule
19(b) directs the court to determine
“whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed.” Under Rule
19(b), the court also must evaluate
the degree of actual prejudice to the
nonparty as opposed to the theoretical possibility that injury will occur.
Whether a particular nonparty
described in Rule 19(a) will be
regarded as indispensable depends
to a considerable degree on the circumstances of each case.
Rule 19(b) enumerates four factors
that must be given attention by the
270

court. (These factors are not mutually exclusive and are not the only
considerations that may be taken
into account in a particular case.)
The first factor is the extent to
which adverse consequences may
result from proceeding without the
absentee. This factor emphasizes
the need to protect absent persons
from litigation that might adversely
affect their interests in the subject
matter of the action, including
inconsistent judgments, and the
need to protect those who are parties from the threat of multiple
actions.
The second factor is whether the
court has any way to minimize the
possible adverse consequences to
the absentee. This requires the court
to make a fact-specific analysis.
The third factor is whether a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence will be adequate. This factor recognizes the public’s interest
in efficient and final disposition of
legal disputes.
The fourth factor provided by Rule
19(b) is whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for nonjoinder of
the absentee. Dismissal will not be a
hardship when a plaintiff is able to
bring the action in another federal
or state court. However, there may
not always be an alternative forum
in which all interested parties can
be joined.
With respect to the question of
whether the Rule 19 issue is properly before the Supreme Court, the
petitioners contend that it was
properly before the Ninth Court and
therefore is properly before the
Supreme Court. Petitioners say that
the Philippine National Bank and
Arelma had an unquestioned right
to appeal and seek certiorari. When
they did, petitioners argue that the
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Supreme Court became obligated to
apply Rule 19(b) so as to protect
the absent party, who had no opportunity to plead and prove its interest in the lower courts.
Pimentel argues that Arelma and
the bank lack standing to raise the
issue of the Republic’s indispensability on appeal because they no
longer challenge the lower courts’
rulings that they are not entitled to
the disputed assets, and thus they
have no further direct interest in
the outcome of this litigation.
In addition, the petitioners assert
that the Republic had the right to
appeal the Rule 19 question on its
own. The petitioners note that the
Republic was named a party to this
litigation and that while a party it
requested the relief it is seeking
now on appeal and by certiorari.
Under the circumstances of this
case, petitioners contend the appeal
simply permits the Republic to continue pursuing the relief it requested before its technical dismissal
from the suit.
Pimentel, however, argues that the
Republic does not have the power to
appeal the judgment. According to
Pimentel, the Republic made the
strategic determination to withdraw
from this interpleader action, and it
chose not to intervene in the trial
proceeding even after the trial judge
ruled that it was not an indispensable
party. Pimentel points out that the
Republic is not bound in any way by
the rulings made by the lower courts
during the course of the interpleader
procedure. It is Pimentel’s position
that allowing the Republic to appeal
at this point would be contrary to the
core principle that only parties (or
those that intervene) can appeal, and
allowing the appeal would disrupt the
orderly conduct of litigation.
With respect to the merits of this
case, petitioners argue that the case

should be dismissed under Rule
19(b). They assert that the sovereign immunity of an absent party is
a substantive factor that is compelling and requires dismissal of the
action. According to the petitioners,
permitting the suit to proceed in the
Republic’s absence would override
its immunity as a practical matter,
effectively depriving the Republic of
assets it claims under Philippine law
and coercing it to participate in the
litigation.
Apart from the question of immunity, the petitioners say the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis misapplied the
equitable considerations that bear
on indispensability under Rule 19.
The petitioners claim the judgment
substantially impaired the
Republic’s interest in the Arelma
assets. They reason that the Ninth
Circuit’s belief that the Republic
would not prevail if it brought suit
to recover those assets is both legally immaterial and wrong on its own
terms. The petitioners state that the
judgment could not possibly be
structured to protect the Republic’s
interest.
Disagreeing with the petitioners,
Pimentel argues that in determining
that the Republic was not an indispensable party to the interpleader
the lower courts followed the language of Rule 19(b) and the
Supreme Court’s guidance in
Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968). He says the courts’ decisions, made after weighing all relevant factors under the standard of
equity and good conscience, were
not an abuse of discretion.
Pimentel points out that the
Republic has participated actively in
litigation in U.S. courts regarding
purported Marcos assets without
previously asserting sovereign
immunity in those actions. Pimentel
says the Republic has known about

the Arelma assets since at least
1986 and notes that it sought the
assistance of a U.S. court to freeze
those assets in 1987. Pimentel
stresses that prior to the entry of
the interpleader judgment, the
Republic never made any effort
whatsoever to establish its claim to
ownership of these assets, in either
a Philippine or a U.S. court.
Pimentel points out that the lower
courts concluded the assets were
owned by Marcos and determined
the Class of Human Rights Victims
was entitled to these assets. He
argues that since the Republic made
the strategic decision to withdraw
from the interpleader, it should be
bound by the consequences of its
decision.
The petitioners argue that the judgment could not possibly be structured to protect the Republic’s interest. They also argue the judgment is
not adequate because it wholly discounts the Republic’s claim and does
not, even in the Ninth Circuit’s own
view, completely resolve the Arelma
dispute. The petitioners contend
there is no need for an alternative
remedy because resolution of the
Pimentel class claim should occur
after ownership of the Arelma assets
is settled in the Philippines and
because the unavailability of a forum
is a consequence of the Republic’s
sovereign immunity.
Pimentel responds that the Ninth
Circuit has determined that if the
interpleader proceeding is dismissed, the members of the Class
will have no forum within the
Philippines open to their claims.
Additionally, Pimentel notes that
the Ninth Circuit found that a proceeding against Merrill Lynch in
New York would merely raise the
same question of indispensability.
The respondent goes on to say that
the Class of Human Rights Victims
(Continued on Page 272)
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has tried to pursue collection efforts
in the Philippine courts but has
been stymied in its efforts. Pimentel
also notes that the United Nations
Human Rights Committee has ruled
explicitly that the failure of the
Philippine courts to permit collection efforts constitutes a violation of
the obligations of the Philippines
under Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

United States. He asserts that the
petitioners have not addressed the
inconsistency between their present
contentions and the position the
Republic expressed in its amicus
curiae brief filed in 1987, which
stated “without hesitation or reservation that its foreign relations with
the United States will not be
adversely affected if these human
rights claims are heard in U.S.
courts.”

Petitioners, however, declare that
entry of judgment in this case would
effectively preclude the Republic
from recovering assets stolen by its
former president, short-circuiting
litigation now pending in the
Philippine courts and interfering
with one of the Republic’s essential
interests.

Pimentel concedes that the courts
must give careful consideration to
foreign policy concerns raised by foreign governments. However, he says
the need to defer to such concerns is
minimal when the courts possess
jurisdiction over the assets at issue
and the matter concerns procedural
issues related to the courts’ management of their dockets.

Pimentel counters that the
Republic’s effort to dismiss the
interpleader at this point is not supported by any evidence or offer of
proof substantiating its contention
that it is the legitimate owner of the
assets. If the Supreme Court were to
dismiss the interpleader action,
Pimentel suggests its ruling would
allow any foreign governmental
body to block any interpleader or
any other proceeding brought by
any judgment creditor to collect its
judgment merely by asserting a
claim to the assets in question without having to present any evidence
to substantiate its claim.
Petitioners conclude that continuation of this litigation threatens to
disrupt broader international cooperation in combating official corruption, causing friction in the United
States’ relationship with important
allies.
Pimentel claims no significant negative foreign policy consequences will
follow if the U.S. courts apply logical
legal principles to determine ownership of assets long held in the

SIGNIFICANCE
The petitioners assert that this is a
case of exceptional practical and
doctrinal importance. By announcing a rule permitting the award of
property claimed by a foreign government, even when that government is absent from the litigation by
virtue of its invocation of immunity,
the petitioners contend the Ninth
Circuit’s decision undercuts the
vital interests served by the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity,
threatening to cause considerable
friction in the relations of the
United States with other nations.

present any evidence to substantiate
their claim.

ATTORNEYS
PARTIES

FOR THE

For Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines et al. (Stephen V.
Bomse (415) 772-6000)
For Respondent Mariano J.
Pimentel et al. (Robert A. Swift
(202) 887-1500)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Republic
of the Philippines
United States of America (Paul D.
Clements (202) 514-2217)
In Support of Respondent Mariano
J. Pimentel
Philippine Human Rights Groups
(Mark S. Davis (808) 524-7500)
Professors of International Law
(William J. Aceves (619) 525-1413)
In Support of Neither party
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith (Daniel A. McLaughlin (212)
839-5300)

Although recognizing that the present case involves a foreign government and international issues,
Pimentel says the case is essentially
a case involving judicial procedure.
He claims the petitioners are advocating for a rule that would totally
prevent courts from adjudicating
disputes over assets, because they
assert the right to block any such
adjudication merely by claiming the
disputed assets, without having to
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